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Abstract. In this paper I try to illustrate, quite roughly and indicatively, the 
interconnections between automation technology and social organization. Central 
to this analysis are the notions of automation, increased productivity in a capitalist 
society, labor, equality, global inequality and the modern culture of technology. I 
will end the paper with brief critical remarks on the question of ‘robot rights’.  
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1. Introduction 
As the Robophilosphy 2018 conference description observes, a strong motivational 
drive pushing the development of robotics and automation technology more generally, 
is centered on the demand for increased productivity. What I want to do in this paper is 
to illustrate, quite roughly and indicatively, how the demand for productivity and hence 
automation is intertwined with our modern and capitalist social organization and its 
imagination, as well as with questions of labor, equality, and global inequality, ending 
with some critical remarks on the discourse on ‘robot rights’. Some of the observations 
I will present here are, to my mind, aspects that tend to be omitted in the robotics 
discourse. 
2. The Culture of Technology as Biopower 
I want to begin my somewhat ambitious attempt by introducing and suggesting an 
essential tie connecting (especially the strive for increased) productivity, social 
organization, and automation. I will do so by inviting the reader to, in his/her mind, 
compare two different institutions or (plat)forms of commerce: the contemporary 
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consumer market on the one hand and the bazaar on the other hand. Now my question 
here is, which of these two more easily invite, as it were, technological automation?  
The issue here is of course not that the different social and economic aspects at a 
bazaar could not, out of some necessary principle, be formalized so as to develop 
different forms of automation technologies to suit it. Rather the issue concerns, as one 
might put it, the complexity of the formalization and hence the technology demanded 
for automation. That is to say, the issue concerns the way in which the commercial 
activity is organized, what standards and norms regulate it and what values and ideals 
underpin it.  
Think here for instance of Amazon’s newly launched Amazon Go, the automated 
grocery store, which is an extension of the consumer market most urban people, I 
gather, are used to. In contemporary consumer markets, as opposed to the bazaar, 
prices are universally standardized, never negotiated—as is more or less the custom at 
bazaars. Products are, usually, organized in linear fashion along straight lines of 
shelves—like most of Manhattan—with signs to help the customer orientate him-
/herself. This is needed since it is the customer him-/herself that is to fill up the 
shopping cart, take it to the cashier, load the products on the cashier desk and so on, 
hence contributing to the market’s overall productivity with a form of free labor. 
Amazon Go has not only automated the cashier desk—this has been done before 
Amazon Go; it has removed it from the equation, something that of course requires 
more automation than simply the moment of monetary transaction.     
Efficiency is a central aspect here. When prices are universally standardized, when 
no negotiation is needed, when customers can orientate themselves and proceed 
quickly and independently, more customers can be served with, as it were, less. 
Productivity has gained.  
The important thing to note here is that even without automated cashiers or no 
cashier desks at all (cf. Amazon Go), the contemporary consumer market, in its 
organization (of efficiency and productivity), is already, as it were, largely automated. 
The technological complexity required for automating some particular task—a 
particular ‘cog of the overall machinery—in this institution is ‘simplified’ to the extent 
that the institution is itself organized along quite strict, determined, predictable, and 
universal etc. standards and norms. This is obviously not to say that the technology is 
‘simple’ in any general sense, but rather only in comparison with what automating 
commercial activity at a bazaar would demand: just think of the technological 
challenge of automating the procedure of negotiating the price of a product more or less 
anew with each customer, or to automate neighborhood gossiping—and to do this with 
a face. And just think of the efficiency and productivity losses this would entail. In 
other words, it is no coincidence that automation technology has emerged out of, so to 
speak, a consumer market culture rather than a bazaar culture: the bazaar does not 
build on the kinds of norms of productivity and efficiency that (de facto) has motivated 
technological automation. 
That the introduction and deepening of automation technology has gone hand in 
hand with the ‘instrumental rationalization’ of high modernity’s social, political and 
economic reality is a topic that has been discussed at length by authors such as Ellul [1], 
Mumford [2], Taylor [3] and of course the so called Frankfurt School [4], just to name 
a few. And reading the programmatic pioneers of modern (techno)science it is not hard 
to spot the instrumental ethical-aesthetical ideals injected into the notion of modern 
‘rationality’. Take for instance the following quote from Descartes’ Discourse on 
Method, where he portrays, by way of analogy, the ideals of ‘scientific knowledge’.  
 
One of the first of the considerations that occurred to me was that there is very often less perfection in 
works composed of several portions, and carried out by the hands of various masters, than in those on 
which one individual alone has worked. [...] In the same way also, those ancient cities which, originally 
mere villages, have become in the process of time great towns, are usually badly constructed in 
comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plain by a surveyor who is free to follow his 
own ideas. Even though, considering their buildings each one apart, there is often as much or more 
display of skill in the one case than in the other, the former have large buildings and small buildings 
indiscriminately placed together, thus rendering the streets crooked and irregular, so that it might be 
said that it was chance rather than the will of men guided by reason that led to such an arrangement. [5] 
 
The connection between the consumer market, Manhattan—or any modern city 
planned and organized under the influence of ‘high modernity’—efficiency, 
productivity, and rationality stares one straight in the face here. What is more, as the 
reader might recollect, it is these ethical-aesthetical ideals of knowledge/science and its 
associated universal method—which is to produce true knowledge “as if by machinery”, 
as Bacon [6] so aptly put it—that is understood by, not only Descartes, but by Bacon, 
Galileo, The Royal Society [4] etc., as the means by which man is to become “master 
and possessor of nature” [5], hence reinstituting the language of Paradise in the mouths, 
minds and hearts of men and thereby bringing forth the will of God in the works of men, 
as Bacon [7] proclaimed. 
One might hence say, with a Foucauldian emphasis, that the politics of 
robotics/automation technology is a biopower/biopolitics; a biopower that has as its 
aim to discipline and control the human mind and behavior through the inscription of 
the universal method and its ‘instrumental rationality’ into social organization, bringing 
forth the works of this principle—the refinement of nature [6]—and manifesting the 
imagination of ever increasing productivity and economic growth, with the subjugation 
of nature as a means to this end.  
3. Labor and the Discourse of Equality 
Let us slightly rephrase this modern universe in order to better highlight its connection 
to labor. Compared to both ancient Greece and medieval feudal Europe, where the 
secular aim of rationality was to, crudely put, organize society in accordance with the 
inherent normative order/hierarchy of the ‘closed’ cosmos [4], ‘modern’ secularized 
Europe, in turn, increasingly witnesses the political, social, and economic 
implementation of a rationality that pictures the universe/nature as open, as devoid of 
inherent normativity and hence in need of artificially/culturally enforced norms: in 
short, an (‘protestant’) ethics of work generating an imperative for ‘progress’ and 
economic growth.  
Or put differently, if, as in the modern imagination, nature was not as such a 
finished/completed creation, but rather the raw material for the industriousness of 
divine instrumental rationality, then man was called to take control and possession of 
nature in order to fulfill the divine work of creation [8].  
This emphasis on (manual) work and industriousness in the modern narrative, as 
Marx and Engels [9] observe, contributes to the strengthening of class-consciousness 
and, according to them, the (inevitable) approach of the proletariat revolution. 
Independently of their dialectical determinism, one might say that what they are 
pointing at here is an intertwined relationship between the notions of growth, 
productivity, capitalism, labor, and social- and economic equality.  
And for sure, modernity together with its programmatic ‘rationalization’ and its 
dismantling of the normatively organized whole/cosmos, has an inherent norm or 
principle of universal equality built into its narrative. Rather than the uniqueness and 
powers of the single human mind, rationality was assigned to the universal method 
alone, a method that was equally applicable to any human mind, independently of 
origins or class (the case of gender is more problematic!), as both Descartes [5] and 
Bacon [6] noted. This meant; each individual was equal under the rule of instrumental 
reason. Compare: each individual is (principally) equal under the rule of capitalist 
market logic [10]. 
Let us make a brave jump and reflect more concretely on the intertwinement of 
labor and equality in modern times. One of the central ways in which the ideal of 
equality has made its way into social reality very concretely is obviously through the 
working class’s growing standards of living and the access to for instance education, 
services, and commodities formerly only available to the aristocracy and upper-classes. 
Again, a central trait here has been the increase of labor wages as one of the main 
mechanisms of distribution of wealth created within the capitalist system as well as 
progressive taxation and their allocation to social security, infrastructure etc., all 
building-blocks of the modern welfare state. Here again, especially the demand for 
mass production of consumer goods, their economic availability and the increase of 
labor wages have, in various and interconnected ways, contributed to the increasing 
automation of production/labor [2]. 
The increase of social and economic equality has obviously reshaped social reality 
in many ways, especially in those countries like the Nordic welfare states where the 
level of equality has pierced the social structure quite comprehensibly. My specific 
interest here will now be the way, I believe, in which a paradoxical relationship 
emerges between equality and automation when equality in and through a capitalist 
society is established locally/regionally. Let me introduce this theme with the help of a 
simple example.  
Still during my mother’s youth (in the 60’s), not to speak of my grandmothers, it 
was not at all uncommon for the upper-middle class, not to speak of the very wealthy, 
to have a live-in or full time servant. This was made possible because the servant’s 
labor costs were relatively cheap, and because it was perceived as socially acceptable to 
house such class distinctions. In other words, it was made possible by a high degree of 
social and economic inequality. Nowadays, although the middle class does use cleaners, 
I know of no one who has a servant: it is both socially suspect as well as economically 
quite unaffordable (at least in Finland), since the level of social and economic equality 
has meant, as noted, notable increase in labor costs, i.e. a ‘fairer’ distribution of wealth
3
.  
Dishwashers, washing machines and nowadays robotic vacuum cleaners and other 
household-bots as well as more sophisticated service- and entertainment robots have 
and/or are partly reintroducing affordable commodities/services to the middle class and 
making some of them available even for the lower economic classes
4
. Thought of in 
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terms of labor and social equality, it seems then as if these new technologies 
reintroduced cheap labor without the discrimination and exploitation of other humans. 
Or: as if robots and other technologies decreased the amount of labor done by humans 
(in specific tasks) while sustaining or even increasing the total amount of labor done.  
The cheapest robotic vacuum cleaner I found on the internet while writing this 
paper cost roughly 99$. Now this piece of machinery is certainly a success of 
productivity. Just imagine what goes into the whole chain of production of such a 
robot: you have the design and the engineering of the robot, you have the production of 
all the bits and pieces, the assembling of it, and you have all the human and machine 
labor that goes into these phases, plus you have all the labor that goes into the 
manufacturing of the machines that are part of the manufacturing of machines etc. Then 
you have all the raw materials needed for each of these phases, their extraction and 
refinement, and here again, you have all the human and machine labor needed, 
including the logistics of the supply chains/the total chain of production. And 
importantly, you also have the energy (fuel) needed for each of these processes plus 
you have the pocket of the capitalist, i.e. the surplus-value of the product. All of this 
fits into 99$, and the capitalist is, mind you, quite well off here. What a success story!  
Robots or other technological devices (as well as most of today’s market 
commodities more generally) should not, in other words, be understood as individual or 
independent ‘agents’ or ‘units’ but rather as units of a network/cluster of technologies, 
(human and machine) labor, materials, and energy [12]. Now the immanent problem 
here is then that the robot as such, as a piece of machinery buzzing around your 
apartment costing only 99$ plus the cost of energy it needs in order to function—or the 
industrial robot working in a factory—conceals within itself a chain of production with 
which we are not directly in touch with. So the magical trick, the illusion the robot is 
able to produce, is that it can have us believe that we can enjoy a form of service/labor 
which was formerly available to us only by means of a high degree of social and 
economic inequality, now devoid of this inequality. For that there is a robot instead of a 
human cleaning your household does not in itself mean that greater equality has been 
reached—that no oppressive or unequal human labor and/or treatment is involved—
since the robot veils a whole chain of labor, material and energy that is compressed, as 
it were, in the robot. That is to say, it is not only the robot buzzing around your 
apartment that is working, but a whole chain of production, a great deal of it not yet 
automated. —Although people might regionally work less with a specific task, say in 
factories and other areas that have been automated, more people work globally for the 
industry of modern consumer society, in that individual pieces of machinery (and the 
commodities they produce) cannot/should not be understood as independent ‘agents’ or 
‘units’ but rather as units of a network/cluster of technologies, (human and machine) 
labor, materials, and energy. Automation surely does create new jobs; surely even more 
than it takes away, globally speaking. Yet, to what extent global social inequality has 
been reduced due to regional increases of equality, is a question that needs to be added 
to the equation. 
I cannot go into any details here. Suffice to say, I hope, that there are grave 
concerns in terms of social justice and environmental issues connected to the chains of 
production just now alluded to. Not only do we have the concerns of the labor 
conditions and -wages involved in the supply chains [13]. We also have the geopolitics 
of energy and natural resources, as well as the wars (economic, military, 
information/political) fought in competition for them [14, 15]. In addition we have the 
grave socio-economical effects of environmental depravation and climate change 
associated with the extraction industry and fossil fuels [16], also resulting, as many 
researchers have pointed out [17], in both mass emigrations as well as wars. As we 
should remember, what has made modern capitalism and its technologically based 
industry (economically/practically) possible, has been, alongside cheap (and even 
slave) labor, extremely cheap energy and cheap access to raw materials (which so often 
have come from the colonial and nowadays post-colonial areas).  
The basic paradox that I am trying to point out here is that the project of social 
equality and just distribution has not been able to actually disentangle itself from the 
logic of exploitation, globally speaking. Welfare states have focused too narrowly on 
distributing the affluence created by a capitalist logic that inevitably thrives on the 
logic of surplus-value; a form of wealth that rests on the fundamental principle that 
market value can be indefinitely separated from labor-value [10] and is without any 
essential environmental restraints. This has meant that a rise in (economic) equality 
locally/regionally has created new dimensions of economic as well as social and 
ecological inequalities globally.  
These reflections consequently have direct bearing upon the notion of basic 
income, a current political topic intimately related to that of automation technology.  
As a technique of social organization basic income appeal not only to the political left, 
where it is perhaps primarily understood as a new or revised mechanism for a fair(er) 
distribution of wealth, a wealth created by gained productivity essentially aided by 
automation technology [18]. For it also appeals to the political right—or perhaps better 
put, to the systemic status quo of capitalism—as, amongst other things, a mechanism 
for balancing the equation between (human) labor and automation: the market needs 
consumers and consumers need purchasing power, which, in the face of increased 
automation, threatens to be reduced.  
Now the question that needs to be addressed here is what kind of a life-style or 
standards of living—built on and sustained by what conditions and with what 
consequences—is basic income to support or uphold? Is the aim simply to strengthen 
regional/local equality? And if not, if the aim is to work for a more equal world, then 
the question is what kind of standards of living would actually be ecologically, socially 
and culturally sustainable and fair globally speaking? Is the logic of surplus-value 
compatible with such equality?  
We have, I think, compelling reasons for thinking that our ‘consumer life-styles’ in 
fact do build, in their current fashion, on quite (environmentally and socially) 
unsustainable and unjust standards [16, 19]. So without including these reflection to the 
debate on basic income—and social and economic equality more generally—I fear the 
political reality of basic income will simply result in, despite its genuine contribution to 
a regional/local distribution of wealth and the balancing of labor and automation, a way 
of securing the balance and functioning of a consumerist driven capitalist and, arguably, 
inevitably unequal and destructive society/world.  
4. Rights and the discourse of the Other 
Now I want to end by quickly reflecting on the discourse of the Other; on ethics, rights 
and responsibilities, issues nowadays so often attached to the robotics discourse. As I 
have tried to argue, the aims of social, economic and even spiritual ideals have, 
throughout history, been tied to the subjugation of the Other; in the context of western 
modernity, the Other of masculine instrumental rationality. And with reference to what 
was said above, both the affluence as well as the equality in modern capitalist society 
has always demanded the sacrifice of the Other, that is to say, the Other by which the 
One is made.   
We have the ‘classical’ Other as body or flesh and its temptations and sins; the 
Other as the passions. And we have the Other as nature, the Other as animal. And there 
is the Other as slave and/or worker, the Other as the ‘global south’. And then perhaps 
most fundamentally, the Other as woman. Throughout modern ethical discourse the 
Other has in various ways been granted ethical recognition and access to the realm of 
rights. Today, as for instance the RoboPhilsophy conference series bears witness to, 
robots are entering this discourse, not the least because, in very concrete terms, robots, 
as a strand of automation technology, have taken the position/function of—i.e. have 
always been intended as—a worker or slave.  
To my mind this last entry is confused, misleading and bears potential destructive 
consequences. In order to make my point shortly, I will start by saying that while I can 
appreciate the pragmatic and political ‘use’ of the discourse of rights (rights to nature, 
rights to workers, and rights to women), I nevertheless feel that this keeps itself within 
the logic of the underpinning symptom. For as it seems to me, what is omitted here is 
that the discourse of the Other is based on the need to create the Other as part of the 
function of making One, as Lacan would have it. In other words, as Lacan [20] 
insightfully comes to realize, there is “no Other of the Other”, because the One is itself 
underpinned by a fundamental fantasy and has no essence of its own: The One can 
never be made: it is a “misplacement” [21].  
Translating these cryptic Lacanian phrases into more concrete terms, one might 
take as an example James Baldwin’s [22] sharp observation that there is not, nor has 
there ever been, a ‘nigger’, although many might have taken on this identity ascribed to 
them as a misplacement. There has never been a ‘nigger’ because the ‘nigger’ exists 
only on the level of fantasy and social/political identities created out of desire by the 
slave-owner as a way of positioning him-/herself in his/her perversion and self-
alienation.  
What I am trying to suggest here then is that the Other of ‘woman’, ‘slave’, 
‘worker’, ‘animal’ etc. should have rights exactly because they are not essentially the 
Other as a function of the One. Robots and technological artifacts on the other hand are 
nothing but this Other: that is to say, they are nothing independent of our human will to 
construct/make them: we do not make the living and responsive beings that are named 
‘woman’, ‘worker’, ‘slave’, ‘animal’ etc., in any other sense than as political/power 
identities/categories, whereas we very concretely make robots. Or: other living beings 
are not products of instrumental reason, i.e. products of our power over natural 
phenomena, in any other respect than as political/social/collective categories: it is the 
living, that which is not ours to make, which calls for our moral engagement (artifacts 
do so only indirectly).   
The crucial confusion in placing the question of robot rights as an extension of the 
discourse of rights of women, slaves, animals and even the environment, as for instance 
David Gunkel [23] seems to be doing, is that robots as artifacts are essentially quite 
different to non-artifacts, be they animate or inanimate. This might be expressed by 
saying that while living beings as well as even inanimate beings/things such as stones, 
mountains, rivers etc. are not inherently normative (at least not construed under our 
norms), artifacts, on the other hand, are inherently based on our norms. If we want to 
control and subjugate living beings or even stones and rivers, it takes some effort from 
our side, since there is something there to regiment and control. Artifacts, robots, are in 
their origins nothing but expressions of our will, power and control; we do not have to 
put effort in regimenting and controlling them. We might of course aspire to make 
them more ‘free’ or ‘autonomous’, but all the same, their ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’ 
will continue to be expressions of and always based on our norms, since it takes great 
effort to make them ‘free’ and/or ‘autonomous’. We do not make other persons free or 
autonomous in any other sense than through regulatory power politics, that is to say, 
grant them their freedom or autonomy after it has been taken from them by our 
juridical system of discipline, although we might of course inspire, support and guide 
individuals to grow in autonomy and freedom, which is, arguably, essentially very 
different from making/constructing them so [24].   
My critical point here is then this: Although robots and other automation 
technologies are part of the dialectics of labor and equality, it is not the robots 
(themselves) that we need to think of in moral terms but rather the drive of instrumental 
reason behind it, its ever widening kingdom, and more importantly, the actual labor 
done by humans in the supply chains as well as the environmental depravation and its 
socio-economical effects. Putting our focus on the robots themselves, especially as 
independent units or agents, risks deepening the alienation and opaqueness high 
technology more or less necessarily comes with.   
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